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Abstract. From 01.07. to 06.07.2007, the Dagstuhl Seminar 07271 Com-
putational Social Systems and the Internet was held in the International
Conference and Research Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the
seminar, several participants presented their current research, and on-
going work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presen-
tations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results
and ideas are put together in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the
seminar topics and goals in general. Links to extended abstracts or full
papers are provided, if available.
Keywords. Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice
Theory, Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Net-
works
07271 Summary  Computational Social Systems and the
Internet
The seminar "Computational Social Systems and the Internet" facilitated a very
fruitful interaction between economists and computer scientists, which intensiﬁed
the understanding of the other disciplines' tool sets.
The seminar helped to pave the way to a uniﬁed theory of social systems on
the Internet that takes into account both the economic and the computational
issuesand their deep interaction.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Combinatorial Auctions, Social Choice Theory,
Behavioral Economics, Computational Game Theory, Social Networks
Joint work of: Cramton, Peter; Müller, Rudolf; Tardos, Eva; Tennenholtz,
Moshe
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1164
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07271
Computational Social Systems and the Internet
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1166
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An Axiomatic Approach to Personalized Ranking Systems
Alon Altman (Technion - Haifa, IL)
Personalized ranking systems and trust systems are an essential tool for collab-
oration in a multi-agent environment. In these systems, trust relations between
many agents are aggregated to produce a personalized trust rating of the agents.
In this paper we introduce the ﬁrst extensive axiomatic study of this setting, and
explore a wide array of well-known and new personalized ranking systems. We
adapt several axioms (basic criteria) from the literature on global ranking sys-
tems to the context of personalized ranking systems, and fully classify the set of
systems that satisfy all of these axioms. We further show that all these axioms
are necessary for this result.






Itai Ashlagi (Technion - Haifa, IL)
A learning equilibrium is a proﬁle of learning algorithms, in which a unilateral
deviation from a learning algorithm is not-beneﬁcial regardless of the state of
nature.
We are especially interested in a learning equilibrium which leads to opti-
mal surplus, in which both convergence to optimal surplus and the number of
stages needed for any deviation to become non-beneﬁcial are polynomial. In the
ﬁrst part of this talk, we entrich the class of settings for which such learning
equilibrium exists.
We consider a resource selection game with incomplete information about the
resource-cost functions. All the players know is the set of players, an upper bound
on the possible costs, and that the cost functions are positive and nondecreasing.
The game is played repeatedly and after every stage each player observes her
cost, and the actions of all players. For such settings, we prove the existence of
a learning equilibrium, yielding optimal surplus.
In the second part of the lecture we introduce the study of robust learning
equilibrium - a learning equilibrium which is immune to failure of the agents to
follow their algorithms for some ﬁnite time. We consider also the issue of system
failures in providing the correct information to the agents. That is, a robust
learning equilibrium is immune against both agents' failures and system failures.
We apply this notion to repeated ﬁrst-price auctions, and prove the existence
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of robust learning equilibrium in that setting. Our proofs are constructive. This
talk is based on the following papers:
"Learning in Resource Selection Games" - with Dov Monderer and Moshe
Tennenholtz, AAAI-07
"Robust Learning Equilibrium" - with Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennen-
holtz, UAI-06
See also: Robust Learning Equilibrium - UAI 06
Item Pricing for Revenue Maximization in Combinatorial
Auctions
Maria-Florina Balcan (CMU - Pittsburgh, USA)
Consider the problem of a retailer with various goods for sale, attempting to
set prices to maximize revenue. If customers have separate valuations over the
diﬀerent goods, and these are known to the retailer, then the goods can be priced
separately and the problem is not so diﬃcult. However, when customers have
valuations over sets of items, this becomes a combinatorial auction problem,
and the problem becomes computationally hard even when valuations are fully
known in advance. In this talk we present some simple randomized algorithms
and mechanisms for a number of interesting cases of this problem, both in the
limited and the unlimited supply settings.
This talk is based on joint work with Avrim Blum and Yishay Mansour.
Keywords: Item Pricing, Revenue Maximizing, Combinatorial Auctions
Joint work of: Blum, Avrim; Mansour, Yishai; Balcan, Maria-Florina
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1153
Trading Networks with Price-Setting Agents
Larry Blume (Cornell University, USA)
In a wide range of markets, individual buyers and sellers often trade through
intermediaries, who determine prices via strategic considerations.
Typically, not all buyers and sellers have access to the same intermediaries,
and they trade at correspondingly diﬀerent prices that reﬂect their relative
amounts of power in the market.
We model this phenomenon using a game in which buyers, sellers, and traders
engage in trade on a graph that represents the access each buyer and seller has
to the traders. In this model, traders set prices strategically, and then buyers
and sellers react to the prices they are oﬀered. We show that the resulting game
always has a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, and that all equilibria lead to
an eﬃcient (i.e. socially optimal) allocation of goods. We extend these results
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to a more general type of matching market, such as one ﬁnds in the matching
of job applicants and employers. Finally, we consider how the proﬁts obtained
by the traders depend on the underlying graphroughly, a trader can command
a positive proﬁt if and only if it has an "essential" connection in the network
structure, thus providing a graph-theoretic basis for quantifying the amount of
competition among traders.
Our work diﬀers from recent studies of how price is aﬀected by network
structure through our modeling of price-setting as a strategic activity carried
out by a subset of agents in the system, rather than studying prices set via
competitive equilibrium or by a truthful mechanism.
Joint work of: Blume, Larry; Easley, David; Kleinberg, Jon; Tardos, Eva
Full Paper:
http://www.cs.cornell.edu/people/eva/traders.pdf
Conversion Rates in Auctions for Sponsored Search
Liad Blumrosen (Microsoft - Mountain View, USA)
The generalized second-price auction (GSP) is used predominantly for sponsored
search in search engines like Google, MSN-Live Search and Yahoo!. It has been
shown by Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2006) and by Varian (2006) that
GSP admits an eﬃcient pure Nash equilibrium. The model studied in Edelman
et al and Varian assumed that all the clicks on the search engine ads gain the
advertiser the same beneﬁt. In practice, when an ad can be shown in one of
several positions (a.k.a., slots) on the search results page, often the lower slots
have higher acquisition rates. We study the implications of relaxing the identical
acquisition rate assumption for GSP. In this case, we show that GSP does not
always admit an eﬃcient equilibrium anymore (neither pure nor mixed), even in
the special case where ordering the advertisers by bid remains optimal. We show
that when the bid space is discrete, an (ineﬃcient) pure Nash equilibrium always
exists. We characterize those equilibria and we also quantify their ineﬃciency.
Joint work of: Blumrosen, Liad; Hartline, Jason
Strategic Behavior in Multi-unit Assignment Problems:
Theory and Evidence from Course Allocations
Estelle Cantillon (Université Libre de Brussels, B)
This paper analyses the assignment problem when agents have multi-unit de-
mand. Applications include task assignment in a team, course allocation, sport
drafts and any other allocation problem where money does not play a role in
balancing supply and demand. There is no known allocation mechanism that is
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ex-post eﬃcient, strategyproof and minimally fair, and practical solutions must
therefore trade oﬀ these diﬀerent aspects. We study such a speciﬁc mechanism
used at Harvard Business School to allocate courses to students. We argue that
students in the HBS mechanism have an incentive to overreport their preferences
for popular courses, that this incentive does not vanish with the size of the mar-
ket and that it results in increased congestion. We conﬁrm these predictions with
detailed data on reported preferences and behavior in the HBS mechanism. We
show that strategic behavior hurts students but that it might still be preferable
to random serial dictatorship over course bundles, a strategyproof alternative.
Keywords: Course allocation, market design, assignment, multi-unit demand
Joint work of: Budish, Eric; Cantillon, Estelle
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1154
Social Comparisons and Contributions to Online
Communities: A Field Experiment on MovieLens
Yan Chen (University of Michigan, USA)
We explore the use of social comparison theory as a natural mechanism to in-
crease contributions to an online movie recommendation community by investi-
gating the eﬀects of social information on user behavior in an online ﬁeld exper-
iment. We ﬁnd that, after receiving behavioral information about the median
user's total number of movie ratings, users below the median demonstrate a
530% increase in the number of monthly movie ratings, while those above the
median decrease their monthly ratings by 62%. Movements from both ends con-
verge towards the median, indicating conformity towards a newly-established
social norm in a community where such a norm had been absent.
Furthermore, the social information has a more dramatic eﬀect on those be-
low the median, suggesting an interaction between conformity and competitive
preferences. When given outcome information about the average user's net bene-
ﬁt score from the system, consistent with social preference theory, users with net
beneﬁt scores above average contribute 94% of the new updates in the database.
In both treatments, we ﬁnd a highly signiﬁcant Red Queen Eﬀect.
Keywords: Social comparison, conformity, public goods, embedded online ﬁeld
experiment
Joint work of: Chen, Yan; Harper, Maxwell; Konstan, Joseph; Li, Sherry
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1155
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Stochastically stable states in load balancing and
congestion games
Christine Chung (University of Pittsburgh, USA)
Price of anarchy (POA) results assume players in a game will arrive at a Nash
equilibrium. The Nash equilibrium solution concept has been criticized for unre-
alistically assuming that players are inﬁnitely rational and have common knowl-
edge of rationality. We show that POA upper bounds can apply in some games
even when boundedly rational decision-making agents use simple selﬁsh strategy
selection rules to arrive at what economists Foster and Young termed "stochasti-
cally stable" states. We also show that in some games these stochastically stable
states are the Nash equilibrium states that are socially optimal.
Keywords: Stochastic stability, congestion games, load balancing, evolutionary
game theory, price of anarchy
Limited Veriﬁcation of Identities to Induce
False-Name-Proofness
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University, USA)
In open, anonymous environments such as the Internet, mechanism design is
complicated by the fact that a single agent can participate in the mechanism
under multiple identiﬁers. One way to address this is to design false-name-proof
mechanisms, which choose the outcome in such a way that agents have no incen-
tive to use more than one identiﬁer. Unfortunately, there are inherent limitations
on what can be achieved with false-name-proof mechanisms, and at least in some
cases, these limitations are crippling. An alternative approach is to verify the
identities of all agents. This imposes signiﬁcant overhead and removes any ben-
eﬁts from anonymity. In this paper, we propose a middle ground. Based on the
reported preferences, we check, for various subsets of the reports, whether the
reports in the subset were all submitted by diﬀerent agents. If they were not,
then we discard some of them. We characterize when such a limited veriﬁca-
tion protocol induces false-name-proofness for a mechanism, that is, when the
combination of the mechanism and the veriﬁcation protocol gives the agents no
incentive to use multiple identi- ﬁers. This characterization leads to various op-
timization problems for minimizing veriﬁcation eﬀort. We study how to solve
these problems. Throughout, we use combinatorial auctions (using the Clarke
mechanism) and majority voting as examples.
Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, false-name-proofness, verifying
identities, combinatorial auctions
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1156
See also: TARK 07 paper + new draft
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Anonymity-Proof Voting Rules
Vincent Conitzer (Duke University, USA)
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders of
(aka. votes over) a ﬁxed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these
alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically.
It satisﬁes participation if no voter ever beneﬁts from not casting her vote. It
is falsename-proof if no voter ever beneﬁts from casting additional (potentially
diﬀerent) votes. It is anonymity-proof if it satisﬁes participation and it is false-
name-proof. We show that the class of anonymity-proof neutral voting rules
consists exactly of the rules of the following form. With some probability kf 2
[0, 1], the rule chooses an alternative at random. With probability 1 &#8722; kf
, the rule ﬁrst draws a pair of alternatives at random. If every vote prefers the
same alternative between the two (and there is at least one vote), then the rule
chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule ﬂips a fair coin to decide between
the two alternatives.
Keywords: Mechanism design, social choice, false-name-proofness, verifying
identities, combinatorial auctions
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1165
See also: TARK 07 paper + new draft
Spectrum Auction Design
Peter Cramton (University of Maryland - College Park, USA)
Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for
wireless communication. The standard approach is the simultaneous ascending
auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence
of rounds. I analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. I then present
a variation, the package clock auction, which addresses many of the problems of
the simultaneous ascending auction while building on its strengths. The package
clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on packages
of lots. Most importantly, the pricing rule and information policy are carefully
tailored to mitigate gaming behavior. Truthful bidding is encouraged, which
simpliﬁes bidding and improves eﬃciency.
Keywords: Auctions, spectrum auctions, market design, package auction, clock
auction, combinatorial auction
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Computing Approximate Equilibria
Konstantinos Daskalakis (Univ. California - Berkeley, USA)
In view of the recent hardness results for mixed Nash equilibria, there has been
increased interest in computing approximate equilibrium points, albeit progress
has been slow. We will present recent developments on the subject, in particu-
lar algorithms which achieve constant factor approximations for 2-player games.
Next, we will consider a very natural and important class of games, the anony-
mous games, in which, like in the stock market, a player is oblivious to the
identities of the other players.
These games or variants are often appealing models for games of many players
even so because the description size that they require is polynomial in the number
of players -as opposed to exponential that a normal form game would require.
We will present a polynomial time approximation scheme for the anonymous
setting.
Auction Design with Avoidable Fixed Costs: An
Experimental Approach
Wedad Elmaghraby (University of Maryland - College Park, USA)
Advances in information technology and computational power have opened the
doors for auctioneers to explore a range of auction formats by considering vary-
ing degrees of bid expressivity and diﬀerent payment rule, e.g., single price vs.
discriminatory prices.
While it is clear that one can design more complicated auctions, it is still not
clear if should do so and which auction parameters have the greatest impact on
the performance on cost and eﬃciency.
The purpose of this paper is to gain some insight into this question, via
analytical and experimental methods.
Keywords: Auctions, Experimental, Procurement, Synergies, Asymmetric Bid-
ders
Joint work of: Elmaghraby, Wedad; Larson, Nathan
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1157
A Simple Combinatorial Auction
Jacob Goeree (CalTech - Pasadena, USA)
We introduce a new combinatorial auction format based on a simple, transparent
pricing mechanism tailored for the hierarchical package structure proposed by
Rothkopf, Peke£, and Harstad (1998) to avoid computational complexity.
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This combination provides the feedback necessary for bidders in multi-round
auctions to discern winning bidding strategies for subsequent rounds and to
coordinate responses to aggressive package bids. The resulting mechanism is
tested in laboratory experiments involving a considerable number of licenses
and many possible allocations. In particular, the experiments provide a wind
tunnel test of three alternative auction formats that are being considered for a
major upcoming FCC auction in the 700MHz range.
Keywords: FCC, Combinatorial Auctions, Experiments
Designing eBay's new reputation system: Experimental
and empirical evidence
Ben Greiner (Harvard Business School - Boston, USA)
EBay recently changed its feedback rules. We study the impact of this change
on bidding behavior, seller trustworthiness and feedback behavior.
Joint work of: Bolton, Gary; Greiner, Ben; Ockenfels, Axel
Implementation and Money Burning
Jason D. Hartline (Microsoft - Mountain View, USA)
We consider the general problem of designing socially optimal, single round,
sealed bid mechanisms when transfers made from the agents to the mechanism
must be burnt (i.e., are a social loss). In these settings the socially optimal
outcome is the one that maximizes the marginal surplus, that is, the sum of
the agents' valuations minus the agents' payments (minus any social cost of
the outcome). In the Bayesian setting where the agents' valuations are drawn
independently, but not necessarily identically, from a known distribution, we
give a concise characterization of the mechanism that maximizes the expected
marginal surplus. From this characterization we observe that the socially optimal
way to allocate a single item to agents with i.i.d. valuations is, depending on the
distribution, to either assign the item to an arbitrary agent or to run a second-
price-like auction. Furthermore, for non-identical distributions that satisfy the
monotone hazard rate condition, the socially optimal mechanism (for any given
social cost function) is the one that chooses the allocation to maximize the
expected social surplus ex ante and requires no payments.
Keywords: Optimal auction design, mechanism design
Farsightedly Stable Networks
Jean-Jacques Herings (Maastricht University, NL)
We propose a new concept, the pairwise farsightedly stable set, in order to predict
which networks may be formed among farsighted players.
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A set of networks G is pairwise farsightedly stable (i) if all possible pairwise
deviations from any network g ∈ G to a network outside G are deterred by the
threat of ending worse oﬀ or equally well oﬀ, (ii) if there exists a farsightedly
improving path from any network outside the set leading to some network in the
set, and (iii) if there is no proper subset of G satisfying (i) and (ii). We show
that a non-empty pairwise farsightedly stable set always exists and we provide
a full characterization of unique pairwise farsightedly stable sets of networks.
Contrary to other pairwise concepts, pairwise farsighted stability yields a Pareto
dominating network, if it exists, as the unique outcome. Finally, we study the
relationship between pairwise farsighted stability and other concepts such as the
largest consistent set.
Keywords: Networks, farsighted, stability, pairwise, eﬃciency




See also: Herings, P.J.J., A. Mauleon, and V. Vannetelbosch (2006), Farsight-
edly Stable Networks"
On Revenue Equivalence in Truthful Mechanisms
Birgit Heydenreich (Maastricht University, NL)
The property of an allocation rule to be implementable in dominant strategies by
a unique payment scheme is called revenue equivalence. In this paper we give a
characterization of revenue equivalence based on a graph theoretic interpretation
of the incentive compatibility constraints. The characterization holds for any
(possibly inﬁnite) outcome space and many of the known results about revenue
equivalence are immediate consequences.
Keywords: Mechanism Design, Revenue Equivalence, Graph Theory
Joint work of: Heydenreich, Birgit; Müller, Rudolf; Uetz, Marc; Vohra, Rakesh
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1158
Aggregation of binary evaluations
Ron Holzman (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We study a general aggregation problem in which a society has to determine its
position (yes/no) on each of several issues, based on the positions of the members
of the society on those issues.
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There is a prescribed set of feasible evaluations, i.e., permissible combina-
tions of positions on the issues. This framework for the theory of aggregation
was introduced by Wilson and further developed by Rubinstein and Fishburn.
Among other things, it admits the modelling of preference aggregation (where
the issues are pairwise comparisons and feasibility reﬂects rationality), and of
judgment aggregation (where the issues are propositions and feasibility reﬂects
logical consistency). We characterize those sets of feasible evaluations for which
the natural analogue of Arrow's impossibility theorem holds true in this frame-
work.
Keywords: Aggregation, Arrow's impossibility, social choice, logic, judgment
Joint work of: Dokow, Elad; Holzman, Ron
Mechanism Design for Stochastic Optimization Problems
Samuel Ieong (Stanford University, USA)
We identify and address algorithmic and game-theoretic issues arising from wel-
fare maximization in the well-studied two-stage stochastic optimization frame-
work. In contrast, prior work in algorithmic mechanism design has focused almost
exclusively on optimization problems without uncertainty. We show both posi-
tive results, by demonstrating a mechanism that implements the social welfare
maximizer in sequential ex post equilibrium, and also negative results, by show-
ing the impossibility of dominant-strategy implementation. We also introduce
a novel generalization of the Fixed-Tree Multicast problem, for which welfare
maximization is #P-hard. We develop a polynomial-time approximation scheme
for the problem, and characterize a precise trade-oﬀ between the incentive guar-
antees and the degree of approximation.
An extended abstract of our work will appear in WINE 2007, and a journal
version is under preparation.
Keywords: Stochastic Programming, Mechanism Design
Joint work of: Ieong, Samuel; So, Anthony Man-Cho; Sundararajan, Mukund
Secretary Problems and Online Auction Design
Nicole Immorlica (Microsoft Research - Redmond, USA)
In this talk, I will discuss the problem of online auction design, or auctions for
bidders who arrive and depart over time. Maximizing welfare in such auctions is
complicated by the fact that bids must be accepted or rejected at the moment
they are submitted. It is known how the classic secretary problem introduced by
Dynkin in 1963 can be used to design approximately welfare-maximizing auctions
in a simple multi-unit auction setting. We show how the classic secretary problem
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can be generalized to a combinatorial setting, and use this generalization to build
mechanisms for a class of online combinatorial auctions. Parts of this talk are
based on joint work with Moshe Babaioﬀ, David Kempe, and Robert Kleinberg.
Joint work of: Babaioﬀ, Moshe; Immorlica, Nicole; Kempe, David; Kleinberg,
Robert
Learning spillover and analogy-based expectations: A
multi-game experiment
Philippe Jehiel (University College London, GB)
We consider a multi-game interactive learning environment and ask ourselves
whether long run behaviors in one game are aﬀected by behaviors in the other, i.e
whether there are learning spillovers. Our main ﬁnding is that learning spillovers
arise whenever the feedback provided to subjects about past play is not easily
accessible game by game and thus subjects get a more immediate impression
about aggregate distributions. In such a case, long run behaviors stabilize to
an analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel 2005), thereby suggesting how
one should broaden the notion of equilibrium to cope with learning spillovers.
Keywords: Experiment, analogy-based expectation
Joint work of: Jehiel, Philippe; Huck, Steﬀen; Rutter, Tom
Positive Externalities, Negative Externalities, and Optimal
Scale
Ramesh Johari (Stanford University, USA)
We study a system where many identical customers use a single service.
Each customer experiences both positive externalities (a positive "network
eﬀect") and negative externalities (a "congestion eﬀect") from other customers
using the service. Such a model arises frequently in practice: application services
on wireless networks are an example. We characterize the social optimum, where
a social planner determines the usage level of each customer. We also characterize
the Nash equilibrium achieved when the usage levels are determined by the
customers themselves, in their self-interest. We study the ratio of the welfare in
Nash equilibrium to that in the social optimum. We demonstrate that there is
an *optimal scale*, i.e., a number of customers at which this ratio is maximized;
further, the optimal ratio is unity. We also show that this same optimal scale
maximizes the Nash welfare of a single individual. We interpret our results in
terms of club formation, and study the size of the club as the positive externality
grows.
Joint work with Sunil Kumar, Stanford GSB.
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An Experimental Investigation of Buyer Determined
Procurement Auctions
Elena Katok (Penn State University, USA)
We present a laboratory study of buyer determined auctions in a setting in which
non-monetary attributes are exogenous and inﬂuence buyer surplus. In buyer de-
termined reverse auctions, the buyer does not commit to awarding a contract
to the supplier who submits the lowest bid, but is instead free to select a win-
ner based on the buyer surplus generated. We ﬁnd that generally the sealed-bid
auction format gener-ates higher buyer surplus levels than the dynamic auction
format. We also ﬁnd that when the value of sup-pliers' non-monetary attributes
is public information, dynamic auctions perform particularly poorly. A use-ful
practical implication from our study is that buyers would prefer sealed bid auc-
tions for procurement ap-plications, especially when they have reasons to be-
lieve suppliers are aware of how much one another's non-monetary attributes
are worth to the buyer.
Keywords: Bidding, Procurement, Reverse Auctions, Multi-Attribute Auctions,
Behavioral Game Theory, Experimental Economics
Joint work of: Haruvy, Ernan; Katok, Elena
Online Pricing and Prophet Inequalities
Robert Kleinberg (Cornell University, USA)
In probability theory, a prophet inequality is a theorem which compares the ex-
pected payoﬀ obtained by two parties each selecting k elements from the same
sequence of random numbers: a prophet, who has foreknowledge of all the num-
bers in the sequence and may select any k of them, versus a gambler, who knows
only the distribution from which the sequence is sampled and must make selec-
tions online. This talk will explore a relation between prophet inequalities and the
analysis of optimal online pricing mechanisms for digital goods. We will present
some new (and nearly optimal) multi-choice prophet inequalities, and we will
apply them to understand the eﬀect of diﬀerent temporal incentive constraints
on the expected revenue of the optimal dominant-strategy incentive-compatible
online mechanism.
Joint work with MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Tuomas Sandholm, and Ymir
Vigfusson.
Approximability of Pricing Problems
Piotr Krysta (University of Liverpool, GB)
Suppose a seller wants to sell a ﬁnite collection of goods which can be available
in limited or unlimited supply.
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We have a set of potential customers and each customer speciﬁes a single
subset of goods she is interested in and the maximum price she is willing to
pay for that subset. If the goods are the edges of a graph and customers are
requesting to purchase paths in this graph, then we can think of the problem
as pricing computer network connections or transportation links. We call such
customers single-minded as they are interested in whole single subset of goods.
The problem is to compute the prices for goods so as to maximize the overall
revenue of the seller.
In another setting we will consider, called unit-demand, each customer also
declares a single subset of goods together with non-zero budgets for each single
good, and a ranking of all the goods the customer is interested in.
Once prices are ﬁxed, each customer chooses to buy one of the goods she can
aﬀord based on some predeﬁned selection rule, such as min-buying, max-buying,
and rank-buying. Again, the objective is to ﬁnd the prices of goods to maximize
the revenue of the seller.
In this talk we will consider the approximability of such problems, and will
discuss both approximation algorithms and non-approximability results for some
variants of these problems.
Joint work of: Krysta, Piotr; Briest, Patrick
Reducing Costly Information Acquisition in Auctions
Kate Larson (University of Waterloo, CA)
Most auction research assumes that potential bidders have private information
about their willingness to pay for an item. In reality, bidders often have to go
through a costly information-gathering process in order to learn their valuations.
Recent attempts at modelling this phenomena has brought to light complex
strategic behaviour arising from information-gathering, and has shown that tra-
ditional approaches to auction and mechanism design are not able to overcome
it.
Keywords: Auctions, Information Gathering
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1159
Truthful Mechanism Design for Multi-Dimensional
Scheduling via Cycle Monotonicity
Ron Lavi (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines
in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the
strategic players.
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This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive
result for makespan minimization in such a domain is an m-approximation truth-
ful mechanism due to Nisan and Ronen [23]. (Even the existence of a nearoptimal
truthful mechanism is not known.) We study a wellmotivated special case of this
problem, where the processing time of a job on each machine may either be
"low" or "high", and the low and high values are public and job-dependent.
This preserves the multidimensionality of the domain, and generalizes the
restricted-machines (i.e., pj ,1) setting in scheduling. We give a general tech-
nique to convert any capproximation algorithm to a 3c-approximation truthful-
inexpectation mechanism, and thus show that there exists a 3-approximation
truthful-in-expectation mechanism for this problem. This is one of the few known
results that shows how to export approximation algorithms for a multidimen-
sional problem into truthful mechanisms in a black-box fashion.
When the low and high values are the same for all jobs (which is still a
multidimensional domain), we devise a deterministic 2-approximation truthful
mechanism. These are the ﬁrst truthful mechanisms with non-trivial performance
guarantees for a multidimensional scheduling domain.
Our constructions are novel in two respects. First, we do not utilize or rely
on explicit price deﬁnitions to prove truthfulness; instead we design algorithms
that satisfy cycle monotonicity. Cycle monotonicity [24] is a necessary and suf-
ﬁcient condition for truthfulness, which may be viewed as the parallel of value
monotonicity for multidimensional domains. However, whereas value monotonic-
ity has been used extensively and successfully to design truthful mechanisms in
single-dimensional domains, ours is the ﬁrst work that leverages cycle monotonic-
ity in the multidimensional setting; our methods and analyses shed new light on
its potential usefulness. Second, our randomized mechanisms are obtained by
ﬁrst constructing a fractional truthful mechanism for a fractional relaxation of
the problem, and then converting it into a truthful-in-expectation mechanism.
This builds upon a technique of [17], and shows the usefulness of fractional
mechanisms in truthful mechanism design.
Joint work of: Lavi, Ron; Swamy, Chaitanya
Revenue Monotonicity in Combinatorial Auctions
Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia - Vancouver, CA)
Intuitively, one might expect that a seller's revenue from an auction weakly in-
creases as the number of bidders grows, as this increases competition. However,
it is known that for combinatorial auctions that use the VCG mechanism, a seller
can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. We investigate the extent
to which this phenomenon can occur under other dominant-strategy combinato-
rial auction mechanisms. We show that such failures of "revenue monotonicity"
are not limited to mechanisms that achieve eﬃcient allocations. Instead, they
can occur under any dominant-strategy direct mechanism that sets prices using
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critical values, and that is maximal with respect to at least two bidders. We say
that a mechanism is maximal with respect to bidder i if and only if the mecha-
nism always chooses an allocation such that either (i) bidder i wins, or (ii) the
allocation cannot be augmented to award bidder i a bundle that she values more
than some predeﬁned constant amount. Examples of such mechanisms include
aﬃne maximizers and mechanisms that always select weakly Pareto eﬃcient
allocations.
Keywords: Combinatorial Auctions, Revenue, Auction Theory, Game Theory
Joint work of: Rastegari, Baharak; Condon, Anne; Leyton-Brown, Kevin
Full Paper:
http://cs.ubc.ca/∼kevinlb/papers/2007-AAAI-RevenueMonotonicity.pdf
Keeping the bad stuﬀ out: structuring incentives for user
behavior
Jeﬀrey MacKie-Mason (University of Michigan, USA)
Humans are smart components in a system, but cannot be directly programmed
to perform; rather, their autonomy must be respected as a design constraint and
incentives provided to induce desired behavior. Sometimes these incentives are
properly aligned, and the humans don't represent a vulnerability. But often, a
misalignment of incentives causes a weakness in the system that can be exploited
by clever attackers. Incentive-centered design tools help us understand these
problems, and provide design principles to alleviate them. We describe incentive-
centered design and some tools it provides. We provide a number of examples
of security and related problems for which incentive centered design might be
helpful. We elaborate with a general screening model that oﬀers strong design
principles for a class of security problems.
(The talk will be based on the attached paper, but I will also present another
application, to user-contributed content.)
Keywords: Incentive-centered design, security, user-contributed content, social
computing, game theory, economics
Joint work of: MacKie-Mason, Jeﬀrey; Wash, Rick
See also: Rick Wash and Jeﬀrey K. MacKie-Mason (2007),
Eﬃciency and Revenue Maximization in Dynamic
Allocation Problems with Heterogenous Objects and
Random Arrivals
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn, D)
We study the dynamic allocation of several heterogenous objects to privately
informed, randomly arriving agents.
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First, we characterize all dynamic, incentive compatible allocation schemes.
Then, we focus on two designer's goals:
1. eﬃciency and
2. revenue maximization,
in two timing scenarios:
1. the object must be sold by a deadline and
2. potentially inﬁnte horizon with time discounting.
The solutions to these problems are given by complex systems of diﬀerential
equations that can be seldom solved analytically. But, we use stochastic domi-
nance arguments and inisghts from majorization theory in order to obtain qual-
itative results that apply to large classes of situaition.
Mediated Equilibrium
Dov Monderer (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We deﬁne and analyze mediators for non-cooperative games. A mediator is a
reliable entity, which can ask the agents for the right to play on their behalf,
and is guaranteed to behave in a pre-speciﬁed way based on messages received
from the agents.
However, a mediator can not enforce behavior; that is, agents can play in the
game directly without the mediator's help. Hence, a mediator generates a new
game for the players, the mediated game. We prove some general results about
mediators, and mainly concentrate on the notion of strong mediated equilibrium,
which is just a strong equilibrium at the mediated game. A strong equilibrium,
which is a strategy proﬁle immune to deviations by coalition rarely exists. In
contrast, we show that desired behaviors, which are stable against deviations by
coalitions, can be obtained using mediators in several classes of settings.
At the second part of the talk we deﬁne mediators for games with incomplete
information, and construct such a mediator for position auctions.
The talk is based on two papers:
Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz "Strong Mediated Equilibrium" AAAI-
06 Itai Aslagi, Dov Monderer, and Moshe Tennenholtz "Mediators for Position
Auctions". Ec-2007
Keywords: Mediators, Strong Equilibrium, Incomplete Information, Position
Auctions
Joint work of: Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tenneholtz, Moshe
Full Paper:
http://ie.technion.ac.il/dov.phtml
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Strategy-proof assignment with a vanishing budget surplus
Hervé Moulin (Rice University - Houston, USA)
A VCG mechanism to assign p identical objects is feasible is cash transfers
yield no deﬁcit. The eﬃciency loss of such a mechanism is the worst ratio of
budget surplus to eﬃcient surplus. We compute the optimal eﬃciency loss for
all n and p, when we also require Voluntary Participation as well as when we do
not. Without the VP requirement, the optimal eﬃciency loss converges to zero
uniformly in p, and exponentially fast if p is ﬁxed. With the VP requirement
asymptotic budget balance is only true is p is not larger than n/2.
Keywords: VCG mechanisms, assignment, asymptotic budget balance, worst
case analysis
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1160
Ineﬃciency of equilibria in query auctions with continuous
valuations
Rudolf Müller (Maastricht University, NL)
We show that, when bidders have continuous valuations, any ex post equilibrium
in an ex post individually rational query auction can only be ex post eﬃcient
when the running time of the auction is inﬁnite for almost all realizations of
valuations of the bidders. In contrast we show that, when we allow for ineﬃcient
allocations with arbitrarily small probability, there is a query auction (to be more
speciﬁc, a bisection auction) that attains this level of approximate eﬃciency in
equilibrium, while additionally the running time of the auction in equilibrium is
ﬁnite for all realizations of valuations.
Keywords: Query auctions, ex post equilibrium, eﬃciency
Joint work of: Grigorieva, Elena; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Müller, Rudolf;
Vermeulen, Dries
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1161
Eﬃcient Online Mechanisms for Persistent,
Periodically-Inaccessible Self-Interested Agents
David C. Parkes (Harvard University, USA)
We consider the problem of implementing a system-optimal decision policy in
the context of self-interested agents with private state in an uncertain world.
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Unique to our model is that we allow both persistent agents, with a an
agent having a local MDP model to describe how its local world evolves given
actions by a center, and also periodical ly-inaccessible agents, with an agent
unable to report information while inaccessible. We ﬁrst review the dynamic-
VCG mechanism of Bergemann and Valimaki (2006), which handles persistent
agents. We oﬀer an independent, simple proof of its correctness. We propose
a generalized mechanism, dynamic-VCG#, to allow also for inaccessibility, and
identify conditions for its correctness. In closing, we observe that the mechanism
is equivalent to the earlier online-VCG mechanism of Parkes and Singh (2003)
in a restricted model.
Keywords: Incentives, sequential decision making, (PO)MDPs, mechanism de-
sign
Joint work of: Cavallo, Ruggiero; Parkes, David C.; Singh, Satinder
Incentive Compatible Regression Learning
Ariel D. Procaccia (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
We initiate the study of incentives in a general machine learning framework. We
focus on a game theoretic regression learning setting where private information
is elicited from multiple agents, which are interested in diﬀerent distributions
over the sample space. This conﬂict potentially gives rise to untruthfulness on
the part of the agents. In the restricted but important case when distributions
are degenerate, and under mild assumptions, we show that agents are motivated
to tell the truth. In a more general setting, we study the power and limitations of
mechanisms without payments. We ﬁnally establish that, in the general setting,
the VCG mechanism goes a long way in guaranteeing truthfulness and eﬃciency.
Keywords: Machine learning, regression, mechanism design
Joint work of: Dekel, Ofer; Fischer, Felix; Procaccia, Ariel D.
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1162
Optimal Protocol Design for Networks with Selﬁsh Users
Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University, USA)
We study how to design network protocols that minimize the worst-case eﬃ-
ciency loss caused by selﬁsh end users. The goal is to identify the optimal pro-
cotol subject to natural implementation constraints. We illustrate this idea in
the context of cost-sharing protocols for large networks. Our results build on a
complete characterization of the budget-balanced protocols that always induce
pure-strategy equilibria, which in turn is proved using a connection between
potential games and the Shapley value.
Joint work of: Chen, Ho-Lin; Roughgarden, Tim; Valiant, Gregory
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Manipulation-Resistant Recommender Systems
Rahul Sami (University of Michigan, USA)
An attacker can draw attention to items that don't deserve that attention by
manipulating recommender systems. We describe an inﬂuence-limiting algorithm
that can turn existing recommender systems into manipulation-resistant system.
Honest reporting of ratings is the optimal strategy for raters who wish to maxi-
mize their inﬂuence. If an attacker can create only a bounded number of shills,
the attacker can mislead only a small amount. However, the system eventually
makes full use of information from honest, informative raters. In addition to the
inﬂuence-limiting algorithm, a second contribution of the paper is a characteri-
zation of the information contribution of raters in terms of information-theoretic
concepts of entropy reduction. This characterization is used both in setting in-
ﬂuence limits and in analyzing the information loss created by those limits.
Joint work of: Sami, Rahul; Resnick, Paul
Signalling Preferences in Interviewing Markets
Michael A. Schwarz (Yahoo Research - Berkeley, USA)
The process of match formation in matching markets can be divided into three
parts: information sharing, investments in information acquisition, and the for-
mation of matches based on available information. The last stage where agents
are assumed to know their preferences has been studied in seminal work of Gale
and Shapley (1962), and a model of second stage costly information acquisition
is introduced and studied in Lee and Schwarz (2007). This paper focuses on the
ﬁrst stage  information sharing  and examines mechanisms which allow work-
ers to signal their preferences over matching partners prior to the assignment of
interviews. The incentives of ﬁrms and workers vis-a-vis information revelation
are partially aligned  all other things being equal, a worker prefers to have an
interview with a ﬁrm that is high in his preference ranking and a ﬁrm prefers to
invest in interviewing a worker who ranks a ﬁrm highly because such worker is
more likely to accept a job if oﬀered. However, the incentives are far from being
perfectly aligned. For instance, if ﬁrms pay the full cost of interviewing, each
worker would prefer to have as many interviews as possible, and in a world with
bilateral communication no information is revealed as each workers would want
to tell each ﬁrm that it is his ﬁrst choice. But if communication is moderated
through an intermediary or there is a restriction on the number of messages a
worker can send, then cheap talk becomes informative. Currently existing mar-
ket institutions that facilitate information exchange prior to interviewing are
discussed.
Keywords: Cheap talk, job search, labor market, matching, interview assign-
ment
Computational Social Systems and the Internet 21
Joint work of: Lee, Robin S.; Schwarz, Michael A.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1163
Inapproximability of Congestion Games
Alexander Skopalik (RWTH Aachen, D)
A natural and convincing notion of approximation for equilibria in congestion
games assumes that agents are ambivalent between strategies whose delay diﬀers
by less than a factor of α, for some α > 1. In this talk, we show that computing
an α-approximate equilibrium is PLS-complete, for any polynomial time com-
putable α > 1. Thus ﬁnding an approximate Nash equilibrium is as hard as
ﬁnding an exact Nash equilibrium or solving any other problem in PLS. To our
knowledge this is the ﬁrst inapproximability result with respect to problems in
PLS.
Keywords: Congestion games, local search, approximation
Trade-oﬀs in Cost-sharing Mechanisms
Mukund Sundararajan (Stanford University, USA)
(Moulin'99) proposes a general framework to design truthful, budget-balanced
mechanisms. These mechanisms are based on cross-monotonic cost-sharing meth-
ods. First, we discuss the eﬃciency loss of Moulin mechanisms in various com-
binatorial settings. Second, we show that cross-monotonicity is not necessary in
the design of truthful, budget-balanced mechanisms.
Keywords: Cost-sharing mechanisms eﬃciency budget balance strategyproof-
ness





See also: @INPROCEEDINGStrade, AUTHOR = "T. Roughgarden and M.
Sundararajan", TITLE = "New Trade-Oﬀs in Cost-Sharing Mechanisms", BOOK-
TITLE = "Proceedings of the 38th Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of
Computing (STOC)", YEAR = 2006, PAGES= "7988"@inproceedings1250912,
author = Aranyak Mehta and Tim Roughgarden and Mukund Sundararajan, ti-
tle = Beyond moulin mechanisms, booktitle = EC '07: Proceedings of the 8th
ACM conference on Electronic commerce, year = 2007, isbn = 978-1-59593-653-
0, pages = 110, location = San Diego, California, USA, doi = http://doi.acm.org/
10.1145/1250910.1250912, publisher = ACM Press, address = New York, NY,
USA,
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Measuring the Inﬂuence of Neighbors in Social Networks
Siddharth Suri (Cornell University, USA)
The spread of inﬂuence among individuals in a social network can be naturally
modeled in a probabilistic framework, but it is challenging to reason about diﬀer-
ences between various models as well as to relate these models to actual social
network data. Here we consider two of the most fundamental deﬁnitions of inﬂu-
ence, one based on a small set of snapshot observations of a social network and
the other based on detailed temporal dynamics. The former is particularly useful
because large-scale social network data sets are often available only in snapshots
or crawls. The latter however provides a more detailed process model of how in-
ﬂuence spreads. We study the relationship between these two ways of measuring
inﬂuence, in particular establishing how to infer the more detailed temporal
mea- sure from the more readily observable snapshot measure. We validate our
analysis using the history of social interactions on Wikipedia; the result is the
ﬁrst large- scale study to exhibit a direct relationship between snapshot and
temporal models of social inﬂuence.
Keywords: Inﬂuence, Social Network, Process Model, Probabilistic Model
Joint work of: Cosley, Dan; Huttenlocher, Dan; Kleinberg, Jon; Lan, Xi-
angyang; Suri, Siddharth
Approximately Maximizing Eﬃciency and Revenue in
Polyhedral Environments.
Eva Tardos (Cornell University, USA)
We consider a resource allocation game in convex environments.
Convex environments model a wide range of problems, including bandwidth
sharing, some models of Adword auctions and general resource allocation. We
extend the fair sharing mechanism for such resource allocation games, and show
that our mechanism simultaneously creates approximately eﬃcient allocations
and approximately maximizes revenue.




Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion - Haifa, IL)
This talk is a brief introduction to our work on program equilibrium and routing
mediators. We show that when agents' strategies are computer programs which
are executed on a given computing device, one can exploit the Von-Neumann
dual role of computer programs.
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We show that this idea implies that the set of program equilibrium payoﬀs of
a game coincides with the set of feasible and individually rational payoﬀs of it.
Computers which run such computer programs can be seen as action mediators,
who can act on behalf of agents based on their instructions. Action mediators
signiﬁcantly enrich the set of situations where we can obtain stability against
correlated deviations by coalitions. Moreover, we introduce the study of routing
mediators, in which the above mediators may possess information also about the
behavior of agents who do not give the mediator the right of play. We study the
relationships between the power of diﬀerent routing mediators in establishing
correlated strong equilibrium. We show a natural class of routing mediators
that allow to implement fair and eﬃcient outcomes as a correlated super-strong
equilibrium in a very wide class of games.
This talk is based on the folllowing two papers:
Tennenholtz, M., Program Equilibrium, Games and Economic Behavior, 2004.
Rozenfeld, O. and Tennenholtz, M., Routing Mediators, IJCAI 2007.
The interplay between incentive constraints and
communication complexity in mechanism design
Timothy Van Zandt (INSEAD - Fontainebleau, F)
The curse of the Revelation Principle is that it leads us to focus on unrealistic
mechanisms in which agents report all private information to the principal, who
then makes all decisions centrally. This is not true when communication costs are
introduced. Then partial communication of information, sequential back-and-
forth conversations, and decentralization of decisions become part of optimal
mechanisms. This paper looks at the interplay between the incentive constraints
and the communication constraints. When can they be separated, so that e.g. one
can separately study the incentive compatibility of a social choice rule and the
minimum-cost communication protocol that realizes the social choice rule? When
do incentive constraints increase the communication complexity of realizing a
social choice rule?
Keywords: Mechanism design, communication complexity
License Auctions with Royalty Contracts for (Winners
and) Losers
Elmar Wolfstetter (HU Berlin, D)
This paper revisits the licensing of a nondrastic process innovation by an out-
side innovator to a Cournot oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that com-
bines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more
proﬁtable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, ﬁxedfee
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licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two-part tariﬀs. The key features are that
royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the op-
tion to sign a royalty contract. Remarkably, combining royalties for winners and
losers makes the integer constraint concerning the number of licenses irrelevant.
Keywords: Auctions, Patents, Licensing
Joint work of: Wolfstetter, Elmar; Giebe, Thomas
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2007/1151
Complexity of Finding Correlated Equilibria for Extensive
Games
Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics, GB)
This talk discusses open issues on the computation of correlated equilibria (CE)
for extensive-form games.
One approach (joint work with Francoise Forges) is the "Extensive Form
Correlated Equilibrium" (EFCE) where players get recommendations of moves
that are revealed to them only when they have to make that move, rather than
a full strategy (i.e., all moves) at the beginning of the game. Interestingly, the
computational diﬃculty of EFCE seems related to the existence of pure-strategy
equilibria.
Background:
In a game, a CE is a commonly known joint distribution on strategy proﬁles.
A "mediator" draws a proﬁle from the distribution and privately tells each player
her strategy in the proﬁle. The equilibrium property (deﬁned by "incentive con-
straints") states that, given the posterior on the strategies recommended to the
other players, it is optimal for the player to play the recommended strategy. If
the distribution is a product distribution, this specializes to a Nash equilibrium.
CE are computationally simpler than Nash equilibria because the incentive
constraints are linear in the joint probabilities for the strategy proﬁles. Existence
follows from the existence of Nash equilibria, or by a two-step linear program-
ming argument due Nau/McCardle and Hart/Schmeidler. The latter has been
used by Papadimitriou to ﬁnd, in polynomial time and using the ellipsoid algo-
rithm, a CE for COMPACTLY speciﬁed games, where the set of strategy proﬁles
may be exponential (e.g., in a game of n players with binary choices), as long
as product distributions on proﬁles can be payoﬀ-evaluated in polynomial time
(e.g., if the game is symmetric in the n players).
An EXTENSIVE GAME is a game tree with information sets that reﬂect
imperfect information about the game state, a central model of game theory.
Players have "perfect recall", so they always remember what they knew and did
earlier. The game tree is a compact speciﬁcation, but the number of strategies
can be exponential because a strategy speciﬁes a move for every information
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set. This complicates ﬁnding CE because there could be a diﬀerent posterior for
each of the exponentially many possible recommendations of a pure strategy to
a player. Finding a payoﬀ-maximal CE, even for two players and games without
chance moves, is NP-hard. However, ﬁnding just one CE may still be possible
in polynomial time. An easy way out is to redeﬁne the concept of CE. Namely,
consider the AGENT FORM, where each information set is controlled by a sep-
arate "agent" of the respective player. An agent-form CE is found in polynomial
time by Papadimitriou's approach for compact games. However, Nash equilibria
of the agent form may no longer be Nash equilibria of the original game, due
to the lack of coordination between the agents. We propose the EFCE where
players are not decomposed into agents, but where, nonetheless, they only get
recommendations of MOVES that are delayed until the player has to make the
respective decision. The full set of moves (as in a strategy proﬁle) is generated
by the mediator at the beginning of the game. The set of EFCE can be described
by polynomially many linear constraints for TWO-PLAYER games WITHOUT
chance moves, using the known "sequence form" which is of the same size as the
game tree. Interestingly, these are also games where existence of a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium can be decided in polynomial time, which is NP-hard if there
are chance moves, even for zero-sum games.
Note on the current, preliminary set of slides (June 2007):
Many of those slides are devoted to explaining the above background con-
cepts. The talk will focus on the new EFCE concept, and on open questions.
Keywords: Correlated equilibrium, computational complexity, game trees
Full Paper:
http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/bvs-publ.html#corr
